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Abstract: We build a model of a fixed exchange rate regime with escape clauses and output
persistence. In the spirit of the literature following the Asian crisis in 1997, persistence in our
model arises from the inability of the domestic financial institutions to intermediate
international credit. Our main message is that since persistence generates long run credibility
effects that are sensitive to the prevailing policy preferences, the choice of an optimal exchange
rate regime and the preference for a policy target should reflect the degree of development of
the domestic financial institutions. If the domestic financial market suffers from credit
constraints that generate persistence, the likelihood of self-fulfilling currency crisis may be
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However, if financial market liberalisation successfully eliminates the credit constraints,
liberalisation should be associated with a switch in policy preferences more in favour of
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1. Introduction
The experiences from the collapse in the 1990’s of several fixed exchange rate regimes in
Europe and in emerging market countries have generated renewed interest towards research in
currency crises. In particular, a considerable amount of work has been devoted in the past few
years to analyse the link between financial crises and currency crises.
1 Indeed, the experiences
from the currency crises in Scandinavia in the early 1990’s and in Far East in 1997 suggest that
vulnerability to crisis may be intensified not only by structural rigidities in the labour market
but also by financial market imperfections. Such a view is also supported by the influential
research programme on the role of credit constraints in economic fluctuations. From the
Bernanke’s and Getler’s (1989) seminal article to the recent contributions such as Kioytaki and
Moore (1997), Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (1999a) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(1999), this research suggests that the financial link is perhaps  the source of the output
persistence and instability of open economies.
Another insight arising from the recent research (see e.g. Guzzo and Velasco, 1999) is that in
the presence of severe market rigidities, monetary policy that is oriented towards output
stability moderates wage claims, lowers expected inflation and improves social welfare. In
general, there seems to be increasing consensus that market imperfections and output
persistence may make a case for an activist government policy.
2 In the context of fixed
exchange rate regimes, this gives rise to a presumption that a monetary authority that is too
heavily biased towards maintaining exchange rate stability may actually find it difficult to
defend a currency peg if the domestic financial and economic institutions are underdeveloped.
The models inspired by the currency crises in 90’s generally focus on the interaction between
depositors and banks in an international context and in so doing, they do not incorporate the
monetary authority’s potential trade-off between several objectives as a separate argument. The
aim of this paper is to elaborate on the optimal exchange rate policy in an economy that is
characterised by financial market distortions leading to output persistence. We first show how
the model of optimal monetary policy under output persistence used, for instance, in Svensson
(1997, 1999), can be explained by the financial market imperfections that restrict the amount of
                                                       
1 This work is sometimes classified as the “third generation” model of currency crises. See Jeanne (1999)
for an excellent survey of currency crisis models and a discussion on the taxonomy. We agree with
Jeanne (1999) that this “generation” terminology is often misleading.
2 Besides Guzzo and Velasco (1999), this conclusion is unavoidable from Blanchard and Wolfers (1999).2
foreign capital in an economy. We then generalise this model to include the “escape clause”
approach to currency crises. This approach, which tends to be associated with Obstfeld (1994,
1996, 1997), has formalised the conventional wisdom that even though a reversible
commitment to a fixed currency peg renders monetary policy vulnerable to speculative attacks,
it lowers the average rate of expected depreciation. We argue that the scope in which the
conventional wisdom holds is somewhat restricted, as introducing fixed costs of currency
realignment reduces the expected depreciation only when a devaluation is known to be more
costly than a revaluation. This suggests that in countries with a history of frequent devaluations
the quasi-fixed exchange rates may actually only lead to higher expected depreciation and
lower social welfare.
The principal message of our analysis, however, deals with the impact of financial market
imperfections on the credibility of a fixed exchange rate regime. Provided that the credit
constraints are sufficiently severe, the credibility of a currency peg can be increased if the
government assigns greater weight on the output stability objective relative to exchange rate
stability per se. This happens because in a dynamic analysis, an increasing level of financial
market frictions makes the optimality of a floating exchange rate regime more evident if output
stabilisation is neglected. Shocks that are not properly stabilised in the first period of the game
will cumulate in the second period, thus increasing the government’s long run temptation to
abandon the peg, making the regime over time vulnerable to speculative attacks. In contrast,
knowledge that the government is ex ante willing to put effort on stabilising shocks may reduce
the expected rate of depreciation and thus the likelihood of speculative attacks.
In addition to being able to confirm our ex ante argument on the potential benefits of more
activist policy in the presence of severe financial market constraints, our analysis also yields
some policy recommendations for the institutional design of financial market liberalisation. In
particular, if the credit constraints and persistence are to be eliminated by opening up the
domestic lending market for fully developed foreign financial institutions, the credibility of the
exchange rate regime can be improved by appointing a “conservative” monetary authority. This
is in line with the traditional policy delegation result. However, if the financial sector is allowed
to develop more gradually under domestic ownership with a transition period when the
economy is characterised by credit constraints and persistence, credibility can be improved
under a less “conservative” monetary authority. Under fixed exchange rate regimes, changes in3
the financial market structure should therefore be associated with appropriate changes in the
monetary policy regime.
The rest of this article is organised as follows. The model of self-fulfilling currency crisis with
financial market imperfections is introduced in the next section. In section 3, we analyse the
role of these frictions in determining the credibility of a fixed exchange rate regime. The
concluding remarks are in section 4.
2. The Model
In the spirit of the research tradition on the financial market imperfections and business cycles
following Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the source of output persistence is in our model a
constraint on the entrepreneurs’ ability to obtain outside funds and invest. This constraint can
be justified by, for instance, costly state verification, moral hazard temptations and weak
corporate governance hindering efficient monitoring.
3 We introduce this financial market
friction by assuming that the entrepreneurs can borrow at most a fraction n ˛ [0,1] of their
expected future revenues. As in some recent literature (see e.g.  Aghion,  Bacchetta and
Banerjee, 1999b, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 1999, and Caballero and Krishnamurthy,
1999), we highlight the capacity of financial markets to intermediate international finance. For
brevity, we take the starkest possible approach, as the  lending in our model can only be
extended by the foreign investors. This assumption also considerably simplifies our analysis of
the optimal monetary policy under imperfect financial markets, which is an issue inadequately
addressed in the previous literature. As a result of the assumption, we can identify n as a degree
of financial market development of the economy in obtaining funds from the international










where R is the international interest rate which is assumed to be constant, and 
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expected output formed by the foreign investors at period t and defined as  ( ) 1 1 + + = t t
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Assuming a linear production technology, we can aggregate across the entrepreneurs, and the
aggregate output can be determined as a function of previous period’s investment and short-run
monetary policy effects according to the following augmented Phillips-curve:
t
e
t t t t z pI y + - + = - p p 1 . (2)
In (1), yt denotes output, It-1 is the aggregate investment level in period t-1 and p > R stands for
productivity of this investment, pt is the inflation rate and pt
e is the expected inflation of the
private sector (pt
e = Et-1(pt)). Under PPP, the inflation rate is equal to the realised rate of
currency depreciation (defined as et – et-1, where et denotes the nominal exchange rate). Finally,
zt is a stochastic output shock with E(zt) = 0 and VAR(zt) = sZ
2. In the absence of shocks and
policy surprises, i.e. when pt = pt
e, output is at the natural rate which amounts to the previous
period’s investment only.
4
As, for instance, in Kioytaki and Moore (1997), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (1999a,b), and
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999), the amount of investment in every period is determined
by the entrepreneurs’ income and ability to borrow. The entrepreneurs’ budget constraint is
given by
1 - + = + t t t t RD I D y , (3)
where the assets are in the left-hand side and the liabilities in the right-hand side. With rational
expectations,  Et(yt+1) =  pIt, so that when entrepreneurs are credit constrained,  Dt  =  npIt/R.
Clearly, the entrepreneurs are credit constrained as far as Dt < It or, equivalently, n < R/p. When
n is sufficiently high (n ‡ R/p), the investment level is independent on current output. 
5
                                                                                                                                                                
3 For an account of a link between corporate governance and currency crises, see Johnson, Boone,
Breach and Friedman (1999).
4 We resort to this version of the aggregate Lucas-type supply function in order to make our model
comparable to the research tradition in monetary policy following Barro and Gordon (1983). In this
tradition, the supply function is usually derived under assumptions on labour market frictions. However,
a similar supply function can easily be obtained from the financial market considerations alone as shown
in Jeanne (1999).
5 If n‡R/p, the credit constraint vanishes, and the investment level Dt=It is determined by the supply of
international finance and the international interest rate. For our purpose there is no need to explicitly
analyse this case; it is sufficient to note that when the activities in the economy are unconstrained, there
is no persistence in output.5
Assume now that debt contracts can be written contingent on the output so that Dt-1 = nyt/R.
when the credit constraint is binding. This assumption not only simplifies our set-up, but it can
also be shown that it is in general optimal to index debt contracts (see e.g. Krishnamurthy,
1998). Note that even though the level of debt is increasing in the inflation rate (via yt, due to
the contingency assumption), debt is hedged against the changes in the real exchange rate. The




















The fact that the current investment depends on current output when the financial market is
underdeveloped (i.e. when  n<R/p) generates persistence in output. By some minor
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Now substituting (5) for (2) yields
t
e
t t t t z y y + - + = - p p r 1 , (6)












r . In other words, in every period the natural rate of output amounts to
the rate of which the previous period’s output carries over due to the economy’s inability to
clear. This rate, captured by r, in turn is a decreasing function of the degree of financial market
development, that is, dr/dn<0. We have therefore arrived at the supply function with output
persistence that has recently been applied e.g. by Jeanne (1997, 1999) and Svensson (1997,
1999). In those models, the presence of persistence is usually explained by referring to the
labour market-based microfoundations derived by Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994). We
do not deny the importance of labour market frictions but just provide alternative, and
especially in the context of fixed exchange rate regimes (nowdays often associated with6
emerging markets) perhaps even more relevant, explanation of output persistence in this supply
function.
Given the supply function and the institutional set-up of the game, the government chooses the
rate of currency depreciation in order to minimise a standard loss function that is quadratic in
both output and inflation (currency depreciation). We assume that the economy’s transmission
mechanism is fully known and such that the government can directly control the inflation rate
and, due to the PPP assumption, the exchange rate. Government’s loss function is then given by
[ ] ) ( ) (
2
1 2 2
t t t t C y y L p lp + - + =
* , (7)
where  l > 0 is the relative weight assigned by the government on the respective policy
objectives. We assume that the private sector knows the government’s preferences, i.e. there is
no uncertainty about l.
6 The standard time-inconsistency problem is here captured by assuming
that y*, government’s target level of output, is higher than the natural rate. Therefore, under a
finite l and under discretionary policymaking the government has an incentive to generate
policy surprises. Under a fixed exchange rate rule the government commits ex ante to a zero
rate of depreciation so that pt = 0.
7
In practice, a binding commitment to a fixed exchange rate regime is hardly possible. Instead,
what we observe could be called “fixed-but-adjustable” regime, where the government can
utilise some escape clause that allows it to abandon the fixed currency peg in the aftermath of
an exceptionally large output shock. The purpose of the commitment is, however, to temper the
credibility problem by rendering the exercise of such an escape clause option costly. These
costs are captured by the last term C(pt) in government’s loss function (7). More specifically,
the government has placed itself in a position where any upward change in et (a devaluation,
                                                       
6 Together with the assumption that the transmission mechanism is known, this could reflect a situation
where the economy’s political and economic features have become familiar to the different parties of the
economy, perhaps over a longer period of time.
7 The literature on optimal central bank institutions (Rogoff 1985, Lohmann 1992, Walsh 1995, Svensson
1997 and others) analyses the case where government tries to move from the discretionary equilibrium
towards the time-inconsistent optimal policy rule by explicitly delegating monetary policy to an agent
with different preferences and/or targets. The equilibrium time-consistent inflation rate under an
optimally designed monetary institution is lower than under government’s discretion.7
implying that pt > 0) has a cost of C(pt) = cd whereas any downward change in et (a revaluation,
implying pt < 0) has a cost of C(pt) = cr.
8
The timing of events is as follows. (i) The private sector rationally forms its expectations on the
future rate of depreciation, knowing that period’s level of investment and the government’s
output target y*. (ii) The output shock is realised. (iii) The government makes the realignment
decision. If the government opts for discretionary monetary policy (floating exchange rate), the
external value of the currency is determined by private sector expectations only. In other words,
the government chooses the money supply rate and thereby the rate of depreciation, after
observing the shock and taking the expectations as given.
9 The government’s strategy can thus
be expressed as functions of yt-1., that is, the intertemporal decision problem has the following
form:
[ ] ) ( min ) ( 1 1 t t t t y V L E y V d
p + = - - .  (8)
We start with analysing the set of actions following the decision to abandon the fixed currency
peg. When choosing the optimal money supply rate, the government takes into account that
changes in current output will affect current expectations of future inflation through V(yt).
Minimising (8) with respect to pt and subject to (6) gives the following first-order condition,
( )









y y d lp .  (9)
As the problem is linear-quadratic, we can conjecture that the value function takes the
following quadratic form:
                                                       
8 Following the majority of the literature (e.g., Obstfeld 1994, 1996, 1997, Jeanne, 1997, 1999) we regard
these fixed costs as exogenous. An exception is De Kock and Grilli (1993) who demonstrate how the
costs can be interpreted as the political cost of government from breaking the commitment to the
exchange rate peg. Their argument, however, resorts to such a punishment strategy that violates the
assumptions underlying the  Markov-perfect equilibrium concept used here (cf. footnote 6). An
alternative explanation could be that a deviation from the rule incurs a direct cost on government if it has
issued foreign currency debt denominated in domestic currency (For a related argument, see  Bohn,
1990).
9 Note that the autoregressive term ryt-1 will introduce past output as a state variable. We restrict our
attention to Markov-perfect equilibria where strategies at date t depend on the past only through this
payoff-relevant state variable  yt-1. Making this common restriction involves in our framework a
substantial advantage of excluding the strategies that directly depend on the realignment decision (cf.
footnote 5).8
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Substituting for V(y) and writing (9) in terms of depreciation we obtain that on period t, the rate
of depreciation under a floating exchange rate regime is
b






p ,  (11)
where a = dg1, b = 1+dg2, and  t y  = ryt-1-pt
e+zt. Constants a and b are to be determined later, but
taking them as given for a while enables us to characterise the equilibrium without output
persistence. This is the standard case: the rate of depreciation under free float is the higher the
higher is the government’s output target (and thus the more severe is the time-inconsistency
problem). Furthermore, the rate of depreciation is decreasing in l and in  t y , so that ceteris
paribus a higher priority assigned on the exchange rate objective and a lower expected rate of
depreciation lead to lower realised depreciation. Substituting (11) back into equation (6) gives













p .  (12)
Again, if constants a and b were given, one could conclude from (12) that output under free
float would be increasing in y* and decreasing in l as could be expected.
If the government is able to commit itself to a fixed exchange rate regime, the rate of




t y y = .  (13)9
Ignoring the fixed costs of currency realignment, we can use (7), (11), (12) and (13) to calculate
the government’s expected per period welfare loss under fixed and floating exchange rates,
respectively:
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l   (14b)
When there are no options of altering the exchange rate, the government’s overall per period
loss is lower than under discretion. The difference between the two equilibrium loss levels is
decreasing in l, the weight assigned by the government on the low depreciation objective.
Thus, l inversely measures the degree of government’s commitment problem. From (8) and
(14) we can now get the equilibrium intertemporal loss functions under the two regimes:
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We now turn to analyse the role played by the fixed costs of currency realignment, C(pt). Given
those costs, the authorities would deviate from the fixed exchange rate regime only when zt, the
stochastic output shock, is low enough so that  V
Fix-V
Float> cd  (in which case currency is
devalued), or high enough so that V
Fix-V
Float> cr (in which case currency is revalued). Invoking
the unimprovability principle of dynamic programming, it is sufficient to consider one-period
deviations only, and we can rewrite both intertemporal loss functions in (15) by using the same
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Equation (17) determine the range of output shocks in which the exchange rate peg is optimally
defended. If the shock realisations are small,  ]   , [ z z zt ˛ , the fixed exchange rate is maintained.
For given devaluation expectations, a revaluation occurs when zt >  z  and devaluation occurs
when zt < z . Encountering sufficiently large shocks, the government prefers incurring the fixed
costs of currency alignment in order to stabilise output. Clearly, the higher are cr and cd, the
more vigorously the government is expected to defend the peg against the shocks. In addition,
taking a and b as constant, the range  ]   , [ z z zt ˛  is increasing in r and hence decreasing in n,
the degree of financial market development. In addition, it is increasing in  l, the weight
assigned on the exchange rate objective under the fixed-but-adjustable regime. The crucial
feature of our model is, however, that a and b are functions of the parameters of the model,
including l. We must thus solve for a and b before we can make any definite conclusions about
the characteristics of the equilibrium. We return to this point in the following subsection upon
determining pt
e, the private sector’s devaluation expectations.
The essence of the fixed-but-adjustable regime is that the government holds an option to
abandon the currency peg in “exceptional circumstances”, that is, in circumstances where a
large output shock has realised. In other words, the government implicitly defines “trigger
shocks” that release the escape clause and the decision to switch from a fixed to a floating
exchange rate regime, as equation (17) manifests. These trigger shocks have to be incorporated
in the rational expectation for inflation and thus depreciation. The expected depreciation is thus
a function of both the expected shocks and the “trigger shocks” defined as
), ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 z z P z z E z z P z z E E t t t t t t t t t t > > + < < = - - - p p p11
where P denotes probability. As is characteristic for the escape clause approach, expected
inflation enters here both in determining the inflation rate conditional on realignment, and in
determining the probability of realignment. Since the ex post equilibrium inflation depends on
expected inflation and on past output, there is a possibility of multiple equilibrium expected
inflation rates under the “fixed-but-adjustable” exchange rate scheme. Assuming that the output
shock zt is uniformly distributed on [-Z/2, Z/2], the equilibrium expected depreciation reads in
terms of  z  and z  as













t t t dz z f dz z f z E p p p .  (18)
The substitution of (11) for pt
Float(z) in (18) yields
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The equilibrium expected rate of depreciation depends on the relationships between  z ,  z  and
Z. We now make a small but informative departure from the previous literature and derive the
expected rates of depreciation explicitly. From (17), we see that
( ) d r c c
b
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In (21) Dc = cr - cd approximates the devaluation premium in expectations that is caused by the
relative cost to be paid by the government if it reneges from its commitment. The premium is12
positive if the cost of devaluation is lower than the cost of revaluation, because then the
government is expected to be relatively apt to devalue its currency. As it stands, equation (21)
displays how the existence of multiple equilibria hinges on cost asymmetry, Dc „ 0. If the costs
are of equal size, the expected rate of depreciation simply equals to the expected rate of
depreciation under free float, which can be obtained by setting Dc = 0 in (21).
The impact of the devaluation premium on the optimal monetary policy can be demonstrated in
detail by substituting (21) for pt
e in (11) and imposing rational expectations pt
e = pt
Float. The
























where a and b are still to be determined. We can now obtain the average inflation rate by
substituting pt
Float*(z) from (22) for pt
Float(z) in (18). This exercise confirms that in the rational
expectation equilibrium the actual average  inflation rate equals the expected inflation rate
displayed in (21). By noting that the policy outcome under free float follows by letting Dc = 0
in (21), we can easily prove the following claim.
PROPOSITION 1. Under the fixed exchange rate regime with escape clauses, the average rate
of inflation and depreciation is lower (higher) than in the floating exchange rate regime only
when devaluation involves larger (smaller) fixed costs than revaluation.
The explanation of Proposition 1 is straightforward. Equation (22) characterises the optimal
monetary policy when the economy encounters large output shocks ( z z z z t t > <    , ). In such
circumstances, the government optimally abandons the exchange rate peg even if there are
fixed costs associated with such an action. Otherwise, the fixed rate is maintained. However, if
the abandonment of the peg is known to be less costly when the exchange rate has become
overvalued rather than undervalued (Dc > 0), this fact is incorporated in the expectations as one
can see from (21). In such circumstances, the policy surprises must be relatively large to
generate the desired output effects. In other words, even though the rate of depreciation is zero
in the “fixed-but-adjustable” regime under small output fluctuations ( ]   , [ z z zt ˛ ) the average
rate of depreciation will be higher due to the premium in expectations. Therefore, the widely13
held view in the literature that a fixed exchange rate regime with escape clauses may lead to a
lower average rate of inflation thus only holds when it is known that Dc < 0.
3. The Credibility of Fixed Exchange Rates with Underdeveloped Financial
Markets
In this section we return to our primary interest and study how the degree of financial market
development influences the determination of the exchange rate regime.  By prohibiting the
market from clearing every period, credit constraints and output persistence worsen the
economic fundamentals and thus affect not only the limits at which the government decides to
abandon the peg and switch to a floating exchange rate regime but also the rate of expected
inflation within and outside these limits. In order to establish how persistence affects the
government’s optimal choice of exchange rate regime, we must first solve for a and b by
identifying the value function’s parameters g1 and g2. To do this, we first differentiate equation
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Being merely a constant in the optimal policy rule that is given by (21) and (22), parameter a
plays only a limited role in the credibility of the fixed currency regime in the presence of credit14
constraints. We thus proceed to solve for coefficient b that is essentially the channel whereby
past output and the performance of financial market influence current monetary policy. By the
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captures the impact of output persistence on b. This has two solutions but, as b = 1 when b  = 0,
L’Hôpital’s rule allows us to exclude the negative root. Solving for the positive root gives
b
lb b l b l
2
4 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 2 + - + - -
= b . (26)
The equilibrium average depreciation rate and the optimal discretionary policy are now fully
characterised by (21) and (22) where a and b are given by (25) and (26). We summarise the
most relevant aspects of (25) and (26) in the following lemmas. All the proofs are relegated to
appendix.
LEMMA 1. If l > 0, b > 0 and db/dl > 0. In particular, it holds that
(i) If l = 1, then l = b= 1, and a = 0.
(ii) If l > 1, then l > b > 1, and a < 0.
(iii) If l < 1, then l < b < 1, and a > 0.
LEMMA 2. The sign of db/dn is determined by the sign of (1-l).
We are now ready to detect the effect of financial market development on the credibility of the
fixed exchange rate regime. Equation (20a) determines the range of output shocks in which the
fixed regime is considered as optimal. Abstracting from the constant multiplier  d r c c 2 2 +
in (20a), we can concentrate on the effects arising from the financial market rigidities and the
preference for output stabilisation.
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We first use this measure to isolate the impacts of output persistence and government’s
preferences on the credibility of the regime in two lemmas, and then we characterise the
relative magnitudes of these impacts in two propositions.
LEMMA 3: ¶f/¶b < 0.
LEMMA 4: ¶f/¶l > 0.
Lemma 4 simply restates the result of the previous literature: In the absence of persistence, a
higher weight assigned on exchange rate stabilisation increases the credibility of a fixed
exchange rate regime. The main new insight stemming from Lemmas 1-3 can be summarised in
the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 2.  An increase in the level of financial market development increases
(decreases) the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime if the government assigns a high
(low) relative weight on the exchange rate stability objective, that is, the sign of  df/dn is
determined by the sign of (l-1).
The economics of proposition 2 is that the interaction between the government’s preferences
and the performance of financial market in fact determines the vulnerability of the currency to
speculative attacks. Only when a relatively strong weight is assigned on the exchange rate
objective (l  > 1), the credibility of a peg is increasing in the degree of financial market
development. From the practical point of view, perhaps the key suggestion of proposition 2 is
that the welfare results from removing the sources of persistence are sensitive to the
government’s preferences. This implies,  inter alia, that opening up the domestic financial
market to foreign lending may be counterproductive if such a move is not preceded by reforms
in the domestic monetary policy institutions in favour of “conservative” policy preferences.
Proposition 2 is, however, not as such a statement about the effect of the government’s
preferences on the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime. To study this effect we need to

















Lemmas 1 and 3 establish that the long-run effect (the last term on the right-hand side) is
negative, but we must also take into account that the short-run effect (the first term on the right-
hand side) is positive by Lemma 4. The common wisdom that “conservative” policy
preferences increase exchange rate credibility in fact holds only when there is sufficient access
to the international capital markets, as proven by the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3: In the presence of severe financial market constraints that gives rise to
output persistence, the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime is higher if the government
assigns a greater relative weight on output stabilisation. The threshold level of persistence







In other words, we claim that when the financial market of an economy is underdeveloped, a
government that puts a higher priority on output stabilisation relative to exchange rate
stabilisation increases the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime. This finding is
somewhat in conflict with the result from the credibility versus flexibility literature (Rogoff
1985, Lohmann 1992), where a government that maintains a tight monetary stance increases
society’s equilibrium welfare. The conflict arises because the long-run considerations are
usually ignored. When the economy is characterised by credit constraints and persistence,
insufficient shock stabilisation on a given period has a much higher cost because shocks that
are not stabilised will have a negative bearing on future output, thus increasing future
devaluation expectations. In contrast, if the government is ex ante known to “compensate” for
the financial market distortions by putting effort on stabilising the real economy the private
sector can scale down its devaluation expectations, thus contributing to a lower probability of
speculative attacks against the exchange rate. To sum up, our results envisage two different
avenues to increased fixed exchange rate credibility when initially the domestic financial sector
is underdeveloped. If the government decides to eliminate the credit constraints “quickly” by
allowing fully developed foreign financial institutions to take over the lending market,
monetary policy should be geared towards exchange rate stabilisation (the standard credibility
versus flexibility result). However, if priority is given to allowing the financial institutions to17
develop gradually under domestic ownership, sufficient attention must be paid on stabilising
the real sector due to the remaining persistence problem.
10
From an empirical point of view, the series of currency crises in the Nordic countries (Finland,
Norway and Sweden) in early 1990’s provides a good case where the fixed exchange rate
regimes were combined with underdeveloped financial markets and labour market rigidities. In
addition to emphasising that in such circumstances the defence of the currency peg was
difficult, it can be argued that removing the rigidities in one sector may not have been enough
to increase exchange rate credibility. In the Nordic countries the liberalisation of the domestic
financial markets was not matched by sufficient reforms in the institutions of monetary policy
or labour markets. Drawing from these developments, Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) report
how in Finland the liberalisation of capital markets under a fixed exchange rate regime made
the domestic sector exceedingly sensitive to changes in the exchange rate. Obviously, this
“financial channel” must have been even a more prominent factor behind the series of collapse
of the fixed US dollar exchange rate regimes in the Far East in 1997, as the labour markets
were not characterised by significant distortions there.
4. Conclusion
Previous research on speculative attacks against fixed exchange rate regimes has detected two
basic causes for devaluations. First, the fundamentals may have worsened to the extent at which
abandoning the peg becomes a tempting alternative. The second cause follows from a high
expected depreciation in itself that, by reducing output under a zero-depreciation commitment,
creates an incentive for the government to validate the expectations ex post by devaluing the
currency. In this article we have analysed how insufficient capacity of domestic financial
institutions to intermediate international credit can generate output persistence that increases
the vulnerability of a fixed exchange rate regime to speculative attacks. It turns out, that in the
                                                       






potentially three solutions. To obtain some flavour of the magnitude of  b , we can consider a simple
numerical example and let l be equal to unity. We can then observe with help of Lemma 2 that there is a




presence of financial market constraints the devaluation expectations are  lower when the
monetary authority is known to assign a high relative weight on stabilising the real sector of the
economy. This somewhat surprising outcome arises because in a dynamic environment,
insufficiently stabilised shocks cumulate over time, thus increasing the  intertemporal
devaluation incentives. As the fundamentals worsen there will be a reduction in the area where
the monetary authority finds it optimal to maintain the exchange rate peg, which in turn leads to
higher devaluation expectations and an increased likelihood of speculative attacks against the
regime. However, if the credit constraints are to be eliminated, for instance, by allowing fully
developed foreign lenders to take over the financial sector, this long-run effect vanishes.
Exchange rate stability can then be enhanced by delegating monetary policy to an institution
with more conservative preferences than the government itself has, which is consistent with the
traditional literature.
Generally, adding new distortions to a standard framework has the potential of partially
cancelling out other distortions. The outcome that under output persistence, the government’s
preferences may have the opposite effect on the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime
than envisaged by earlier analysis is in line with other recent findings in research in optimal
monetary and fiscal institutions. For instance, Guzzo and Velasco (1999) arrive at a broadly
similar conclusion when analysing the optimal preferences of a central bank in a model of
centralised wage-setting. Broadly speaking, these results tend to suggest that the relevance of
an excessively tight policy stance can been questioned in the cases where the domestic
economic institutions are not yet fully developed creating long run distortionary effects. Our
contribution to this debate has been to shed some light on the links between financial market
development and monetary and exchange rate policy, suggesting that the dangers of insufficient
shock stabilisation can be significantly amplified if the domestic financial markets are subject
to credit constraints.19
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Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 2









































Straightforward calculation shows that (A2) holds if  0 ‡ b .
To prove part (iii), check out from (21) that setting l = 1 yields b = 1 which in turn leads to the
fact that a = 0 in (20). To start with the proof of part (i) we show that the necessary and the
sufficient condition for b < l is that l > 1. From (21) we get that
l
b
bl b l b l
<
+ - + - -
=
2
4 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 2
b .
Rearrange this condition to obtain
) 1 ( 2 4 ) 1 (
2 2 2 2 2 2 dr l dr ldr dr l - + < + - . (A3)
Simplifying (A3) yields that the inequality holds only if  l  > 1. After noting that the
denominator of a in (20) is always positive, it is obvious that the sign of a is given by the sign
of (b - l). The proofs of part (ii) and (iii) is analogous.
QED22
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3
We want to establish the condition when the total derivative in (23) is negative. Straightforward












































By multiplying (A4) by  b b + l b
2 4  one can see that the derivative is negative if























l b b b . (A5)
We next note that (21) can be re-expressed as
( ) ( ) b l lb b l b - - + - = 1   2 1 2
2 2 b . (A6)
The substitution of 2bb+l(1-b) for  ( ) lb b l 2 1
2 2 + -  in (A5) gives





















After some manipulations this equals
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] b b b b b b l b l b b - - < - - - - + 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 b b b b b . (A7)
Employing (A6) on the left-hand side of (A7) yields
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] b b b b l lb b l b l - - < - - + - - 1 2 2 1 4 1 1
2 2 2 2 b b .
By means of some rearrangements, the inequality can be rewritten as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] b b b b l lb b l b l - - < œ ß
ø
Œ º
Ø - - + - - 1 2 2 1 4 1 1
2 2 b b
or, equivalently by using (A6), as
( ) ( ) [ ] b b b b b l - - < - 1 2 2 2 1 b b b . (A8)
Simplifying (A8) produces the desired form:
b +
- >
l
b
1
1 .
QED